FIDE-politics-watchers will recall that this involved a secret agreement between Kasparov's camp and Mr Leong by which the Kasparov Chess Foundation paid the ASEAN Chess Academy (controlled by Mr Leong) a very large sum of money in return for his securing Asian votes for Kasparov in the then-upcoming FIDE Presidential election. This agreement was made public in the New York Times, controversy followed and so did the Ethic Commission hearing.
Leong was evidently displeased with the verdict, took it to CAS who subsequently pronounced their verdict. Their judgement was then published on FIDE's website, perhaps unsurprisingly since it is very favourable to FIDE's original verdict and very, very unfavourable to Ignatius Leong, and by extension, to Garry Kasparov.
I strongly recommend that you read the whole thing (there's a fair bit of verbiage towards the start, but it gets easier) but you may find, as I did, that paragraph 53 leaps out at you. The expression "he sold his vote" can have this effect.
He sold his vote. And to whom did he sell his vote?
The Appellant sold his vote to Garry Kasparov.
Talking of leaps out at you, let's have a look at that last bit again:
no possible legitimate purpose could be served by a confidential agreement providing for prior payment of monies to a corporate vehicle controlled by one elector."No possible legitimate purpose." That's not FIDE's wording, that's not the wording of Garry Kasparov's political opponents or critics, that's the wording of an independent judicial tribunal whose judgement was sought by Mr Kasparov's ally.
"No possible legitimate purpose."
The actual, illegitimate purpose, was to attempt to obtain elected office by making improper payments to an influential individual. This is the sort of conduct that - if you tried it in an election in a democratic country with a robust legal system - would put you in the dock. It would constitute conduct not just unethical and improper, but seriously illegal too.
So now that CAS have expressed, in eyewateringly strong terms, their opinion of this conduct, it is surely long overdue that people ceased to give political support to Garry Kasparov under the pretence that he is some kind of ethical and democratic alternative to Kirsan (which would be a very good idea). That's the impression he likes to give, but it falls apart at the slightest inspection. Kasparov, like his friends and allies, rarely receives this in the English-speaking press, chess or otherwise. This would be a good time for that to change.
- - - - - -
FOOTNOTE: a petty point, perhaps, but while I was putting the above together, I happened to see this from Phil Ehr, whose inglorious part in the election debacle involved issuing political statements without consultation with his colleagues, and then flying to Tromsø to be by Kasparov's side. I'm glad to see that Phil is still interested in questions of ethics. I wonder if he will ever learn that the louder you shout about them, the more obvious it becomes if you ignore them when it comes to the team you're supporting.
30 comments:
It's never been possible to prove, but "purchasing" of votes has likely been a standard operating practice in FIDE elections back to the days of Campomanes.
I rather think the chess world is stuck with Kirsan and his cronies unless or until he decides to step down himself or the Kremlin sack him.
RdC
An alternative take on it.
https://chesscrimes.wordpress.com/2016/11/29/the-curious-cas-case-of-ignatius-leong/
according to CAS you don’t expect them to vote for your ticket themself?
No, according to CAS you don't enter into a secret contractual obligation to deliver that vote in return for money, which is the buying and selling of votes. You cab't in fact assume for sure that somebody who works or campaigns for you will vote for you, especially if they are paying you for the service, and to enter into a contract whereby that vote is formalised in return for cash is corrupt.
(By the way, I couldn't identify an author of that blog, pseudonymous or otherwise - does it have one?)
In my experience, both with CAS decisions and arbitral awards in general, there's an unfortunate tendency to "make the decision" first, and (only) then to write the reasons to reflect the ultimate verdict. This is more apt here with it being a non-prominent case, and the lengthy 5-month delay does make it seem that the Panel head/writer had more pressing commitments (the Olympics for example?).
Since arbitral awards are in general not appealable on the merits, not only are the reasons not so carefully drafted, but there can be a sense of writing directly to the parties, rather than in strictly legal argumentation subject to review. If so, probably the CAS Panel felt that Leong had indeed entered a vote-buying scheme (possibly by more general considerations than the +1), and wrote it in this way to underline that point, and at the same time used the +1 reasoning as a fulcrum so as not to lend themselves to worrying about how wide the Kasparov/Leong net really was. So I don't think there is any Panel-stacking or else going on, even if the legal grindstones find the cited reasoning on the flimsy side. On the other hand, given that both FIDE and now you have pointedly quoted this #53, the ChessCrimes claim on its legal inexactitude and moreover brutish phrasing does have some merit, but if anything, I'd think a fuller analysis would make things worse, not better, for Leong.
From I can tell from ChessCrimes, it seems that Leong would have done (much) better to argue on procedural issues, but that's usually not what people like to do. Leong seemed to base his case on the assertion that his scheme was Kasparov was in fact not ethical afoul, and CAS disagreed. The final part of 3.1 "If Leong has the opportunity to deliver" [my emphasis] more than 15 votes, "the Parties will negotiate the financial terms separately"... well, that looks bad by my eye.
Summing up, the (c) part of #63 could have "sold his vote" replaced by "campaigned for hire", and this would have been just as against FIDE Ethics 2.1 by my understanding, though not perhaps so headline-worthy.
Similarly, the headline here from #54 concerning "no possible legitimate purpose" needs some context.
no possible legitimate purpose could be served by a confidential agreement providing for prior payment of monies to a corporate vehicle controlled by one elector
Although the CAS analysis is a bit muddled in its linkage of #53 and this from #54, it seems that this phrase is simply equivalent to "no possible legitimate purpose could be served by vote-buying." Since in #53 they already conclude as a legal fact that a vote was bought, the usage in #54 of "controlled by one elector" implies that this elector was indeed selling his vote. But the more general question of campaigning for hire (by someone who happens to be an elector) does not really come into play here, as to whether that would be a "legitimate purpose" in FIDE.
I just want to stress that "no possible legitimate purpose" in #54 is contingent (at least as written) upon the finding of fact in #53 that a vote was sold. #54 seems to both seek to explain #53 and in other parts rely on it, which makes it hard to parse.
Summing up, the (c) part of #63 could have "sold his vote" replaced by "campaigned for hire", and this would have been just as against FIDE Ethics 2.1 by my understanding, though not perhaps so headline-worthy.
Maybe I don't want to say "just as against", as there is a matter of degree involved too. At the least, the CAS reading in #57-63 lends support to the interpretation that "campaign for hire" is also contrary to FIDE Ethics.
As ChessCrimes says, it's hard to know where FIDE's argument ends and that of the CAS begins regarding +1 being de facto vote-buying, and whether Leong had the opportunity to dispute this to any extent. Such are the prerogatives of arbitrators who are not subject to appeal. :) In any event, the verdict would (or should) have been written quite differently if appeal were available, so that everything did not ride on the factual determination in #53. (The rhetorician would note the great surety which the Panel tries to impart to the +1 conclusion, thrice repeating "sold his vote" in rapid succession and declaring this essentially beyond argument; and realize that's probably where they are actually most likely the weakest.)
There is also an argument that the +1 being per se vote-buying is contra-indicated by it being in a contract, by an inference that an illegal condition would not be so included (as being unenforceable anyway). I don't know New York law that well (maybe Article 180 on bribery?), but offhand I don't think in this context it would be illegal.
I think that if you made a secret contract with a regional political figure that they would deliver x local districts to your candidate in return for paymwnt, this would put you inside a courtroom. I also think this would apply if they contracted to vote for you - and bear in mind too that it's not even their vote as such, it's the vote of a federation!
After all, if all this was OK, why was it secret?
Not the main point but, isn't vote-buying illegal because it's corruption? Isn't that what is happening with FIFA?
Regarding FIFA: No, look at the Wikipedia page "2015 FIFA corruption case" and the relevant law on the matter. They explicitly say that bribery laws were not applicable (in USA only to public figures), and that RICO and Travel Acts were used. I don't think either would apply here. New York is largely oriented toward "commercial" bribery, and I don't know how much is applicable (the penal laws are terse, but case law must be voluminous).
ejh: I must admit the confidentiality clause is offhand strange (being confidential is stronger than the contract being merely "secret", which could be interpreted just as unknown to others due to volition of the parties, rather than being contractually bound therein). As I said, if nothing else, certainly the parties thought what they were doing was legal, as else it would be superfluous to put it in a contract.
But the confidentiality part looks like such lawyerly language that it might have been included as a matter of course. Particularly with FIDE elections perhaps they would rather not have publicity, or one side or the other figured that mutual recriminations in public would not be useful if the relationship broke down. (E.g., Kasparov fails to pay a tranche: with confidentiality in place, Leong can then sue but can't go public to news media concerning the matter without forfeiture of any claim, not to mention facing additional torts; this would not be unheard of as a business-oriented desideratum in a contract, particularly when reputations might be at stake from public knowledge of a deal that failed. This said, when confidentiality is of import, I would prefer to specify private arbitration if something arises.)
For that matter, why is the section number 6 skipped in the contract?! Many conspiracy theories can arise. :)
More generally, regional politics has explicit laws that cover elections, but FIDE politics does not, at least as a (Swiss) legal matter AFAIK. As above, even with FIFA the corruption is being prosecuted on a non-obvious basis. As an ethical matter within FIDE, one can certainly make an analogue of course.
As to the two causes for action: The word "deliver", while I personally find it telling, could plausibly be argued to be more hopeful than anything else. I in turn would "hope" this will fail, but you never know. The best that can be said is that the CAS chose (rather deliberately IMO) not to have to discuss this.
Perhaps Leong could also argue that the +1 would be interpreted by different people/cultures in different ways (NY is the legal venue, the lawyer is from Norway, he is from Singapore, the president judge is English, FIDE/CAS are in Switzerland). The real question on this narrow point should be whether this +1 (Leong's vote) was crucial to the contract per se (as being any part of the $500K sum), or if it was included as a notational(?) convenience with the parties considering inter alia that Leong's vote was assured anyway as long as he was on the ticket (this latter condition being contractually bound), and still Singapore delegate at election time of course. If Leong had realized the CAS would phrase its conclusion in the manner they did he might have addressed it more, but as has been rehashed many times by now, I don't think the end result would have changed.
certainly the parties thought what they were doing was legal, as else it would be superfluous to put it in a contract
I don't see any reason for "certainly", given that it was supposed to be secret. (Besides, who's going to prosecute?)
Thankless Temerity, you probably know this a lot better than I do, so I will ask.
To what extent is this "vote buying" a question of law, rather than fact? Your final paragraph indicates that there has to a specific quid pro quo for Leong's vote, and in the contract is phrased as $500K for X and Y. My understanding is that as a matter of law, the judge should preliminarily make the inference that Y was part of qpq, though this could be (factually) rebutted? The CAS did mention that Leong argued that the burden had been improperly switched to him, and I wonder if this is what he means, that he has to prove that the scheme is not vote-buying, rather than vice-versa.
Justin, I think what he means is that there's no point in putting an agreement to do something illegal in a contract, as it is unenforceable by a court in any event.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_agreement
As a matter of professional ethics, I can't imagine a lawyer would draft such a contract where the subject matter was clearly illegal, so I would "certainly" agree with TT there.
Without prejudice to the present instance, I'm sure we can all imagine lawyers doing all kinds of things, and "it can't be illegal because a lawyer did it" is no more convincing than "it can't be immoral because a priest did it".
Wasn't one of Lady Gaga's arguments against her ex-boyfriend that his compensation claim ($35m) was based on work as that was de facto done as an "employment agent", for which he lacked a NY state license?
Xerxes: I hate to say it, but it depends. Yes, the judge should nominally make a inference that Y was part of the quid pro quo. Though at the same time, I suspect that the "reasonable person" test could apply to rebut it (even before Leong would give any possible evidence on the matter):
Suppose that A is contractually bound to run on the same ticket as B in an election, and that A controls a vote in the election. In the absence of a bribe (that is, assuming all $500K is in fact for X and Z), is it reasonable to think there is some non-remote chance that A wouldn't vote for B?
That's my attempt to disassociate X (running on the ticket) from Y (providing 1 vote) and Z ("delivering" other votes, in the sense of the second bullet point, involving signed statements and irrevocable proxies, NB: reading this language again really does make it look bad!).
The CAS says yes, this is reasonable, A might very well choose to vote for a ticket other than B's. ChessCrimes alternatively posits no, this is not reasonable, and moreover considers that Singapore would already realize this too. You could also discuss whether X and Y are too intertwined to attempt such an analysis, though the first part of #52 inclines that the CAS thinks they can be pulled apart.
Perhaps it also depends on whether you think A would just break the contract and quit the ticket prior to any decision to vote other than for B, though this in the given context would have significant monetary penalties (the tranches would need to be paid back if already received), and unless mutually agreed IMO would be quite unlikely. It would thus be, perhaps, reasonable to think that A might have a fall-out with B (or get a better offer from C!), and by election time not wish to vote for B though being on the same ticket. On the other hand, one could argue that if there really was a falling-out, then a mutually agreed ticket-quitting would "almost certainly" occur. But is it really "almost certainly" (consider a week before the election, with no easy replacement), or just "most likely"... Et cetera. So a judge could choose what is "reasonable" in either way IMO.
And yes, I hate the "reasonable person" test. Sorry to be of little help in the end.
As to the meta-question: perhaps one could say that the extent that the judge considers any evidence from Leong (or FIDE) concerning what "+1" means is the extent that it's a question of fact, rather than of law. Of course again a judge can spin this to taste. My re-reading of the contract and what "deliver" means has convinced me that the scheme was rotten in any event. Yet the appellate lawyer in me might still put me on Leong's side as-is!
Isn't the primary purpose of a contract to define who does what and how things will operate - i.e. isn't legal enforceability a secondary concern?
Also, what about the competence of the lawyer who wrote the contract?
Suppose that A is contractually bound to run on the same ticket as B in an election, and that A controls a vote in the election
Of course, although some votes in FIDE elections are controlled by individuals, they are not supposed to be, and nobody can legitimately contract to deliver one.
Yes, let alone possible legitimacy in the matter, there's "no *sane* purpose" in knowingly making illegal activity part of a contract. It's not enforceable, and can only be used against you if things go bad. I wouldn't say that a lawyer who would do this was crooked so much, as lunatic. The only benefit would be that you drafted an ultimately worthless piece of paper (and knew this), and palmed it off on your client (who presumably didn't) for a fee. The risk is simply too large (even with confidentiality) for this to more than an outlier event, even among crooked lawyers. The quantum of evidence necessary for a different inference to be made would need to be quite large IMO. It's just not something that a judge would even consider unless there were substantial and uncontestable evidence on the matter. A better analogy would be something like "A lawyer isn't expected to draw up contracts that knowingly involve illegalities, just as a priest isn't expected to knowingly counsel someone to commit immoral acts." This goes significantly further that just committing an immoral act himself. Sure, you can find examples of such depravities of men, but as I say, I put them in the lunatic bracket more than anything else. (My theology is probably dated, but I think this qualifies my use of "certainly" in the sense of "moral certitude"?)
However, much more likely than malice could be negligence. If vote-selling/delivering did turn out to be illegal under New York law (which I must say that I doubt), at worst I'd say the Norwegian lawyer Sand who drafted the contract would be *negligent* (to some degree, possibly large depending on circumstance) in failing to do due diligence over the matter. The contract itself would not be enforceable, and both parties would theoretically be subject to prosecution for the illegal acts.
If the subject is whether the contract violates FIDE ethics, the Kasparov/Leong/Sand view of that Code cannot be held against them except by FIDE itself (and of course, anyone in the peanut gallery).
Wasn't one of Lady Gaga's claims against her ex-boyfriend that his compensation claim ($35m) was based on work as that was de facto as an "employment agent", for which he lacked a NY state license?
I'm sorry I don't follow such culture, but while that would be an example of an illegal agreement (if as claimed), I don't think anyone would be arguing that his lawyer knew this in the first place when the contract was made. Rather more likely, none of the parties involved knew that such a license was necessary, and Gaga's lawyer hit upon this angle when the lawsuits started coming. Or alternatively (and more probably) his work might reasonably be considered under some other title. If his lawyer did actually know that such a license was required, and that the work would definitely fall under this, then he was grossly negligent not to inform (and could be culpable for a very large sum).
Of course, although some votes in FIDE elections are controlled by individuals, they are not supposed to be, and nobody can legitimately contract to deliver one.
By "control", I mean that ultimately an individual (the Delegate) votes.
Is this not how FIDE works? I guess you could get rid of secret ballots and have federations indeed validate their votes in some officious manner, but until then, even if a Delegate can be instructed to vote by the Federation, I would say that it is ultimately he/she who "controls" the vote, and could contract on the matter.
In theory, if you really wanted to analyze the K/L agreement for "vote-buying" (and not just "vote-influencing"), you'd probably have to look at how the proxy system works, and at what point the Delegate assumed control over the vote (I think it's at the 4 week point when the Delegate List is published, as then the Delegate can, if nothing else, assign the proxy and this is irrevocable, even by the Federation).
To take your statement in its literal sense would mean that Leong couldn't have "sold his vote" as the vote never belonged to *him* in the first place, or at any time (he being merely a puppet of Singapore to effect their vote). I don't think this is a good interpretation. Similarly, my strict reading of the Electoral Regulations might be that only after the Delegate List was published could he sell (and contract to sell) his vote, and it was only then that it was "his" in any sense. Again this seems unnecessarily quixotic, whereas both the CAS decision and the K/L contract seem to take a wider view, proposing it an underlying reasonable presumption that Leong will retain his delegateship of Singapore until the election, and that already in Sep 2013 he could "sell his vote" for the August 2014 election. (Moreover, the K/L contract assumes that federations will ultimately have honest delegates who will follow these "written and signed statement[s]" concerning support, etc.)
Isn't the primary purpose of a contract to define who does what and how things will operate - i.e. isn't legal enforceability a secondary concern?
I would says that it depends on the relationship between the parties (and also the subject matter: for instance it would be more prominent in conveyancing property, where assuring competence to convey cannot be neglected). If they are familiar with each other, and don't expect to have to enforce it, then maybe such issues would only be secondary. But in a competitive business context (involving parties of equal stature) a lawyer who didn't firstly consider whether a contract would be enforceable should not have many clients. (Isn't it Danailov who says that Bulgarian businessmen typically set aside 10-15% a year for lawsuits over contractual disputes?) Of course, *considering* whether a contract is (likely to be) enforceable isn't the same as *concluding* that it is, which is ultimately the judge's decision.
Every lawyer should simply tick the textbook boxes with every negotiated contract before sending out the final drafts: offer, acceptance, competence and intent (to contract), lawful matter, mutuality, and consideration. If they do that in a manner commensurate to the contract at hand, questions of enforceability will be the exception rather than the rule. Here I fully expect that Sand saw no particular reason to consider the matter to be unlawful.
Also, what about the competence of the lawyer who wrote the contract?
It depends on what instructions he received. The parties implicitly expect a lawyer to have sufficient knowledge of law in general so that the contract is not plainly based on illegal acts. Whether they need to explicitly request the lawyer to go beyond that, or instead the implicit warranty would include specific knowledge of NY state case law on the matter here, is circumstantial and less easy to say. I would not call a lawyer "incompetent" if he had no reason to believe the scheme was illegal, and his mind was not turned to look at the specifics of that question by an inquiry from the client. And I repeat, I find it difficult to see (even after perusing NY law) how the contractually specified acts are illegal, even if construed as gross bribes.
I personally find the scheme unethical (as bribery often is, though using that word in the first place often biasses the inquiry), but that's something ultimately specific to FIDE, and again the parties would have to ask their lawyer(s) to turn their minds to that question for the question of lawyerly competence to arise. (Sand is of course a FIDE insider, so he should be held to a higher standard here of knowing what is considered ethical therein, and the extent to which his client(s) should care about such issues.)
Of course, although some votes in FIDE elections are controlled by individuals, they are not supposed to be, and nobody can legitimately contract to deliver one.
"By "control", I mean that ultimately an individual (the Delegate) votes."
To clarify, what I mean is that as a practical matter in the FIDE context, a court would look at the Delegate as effectively controlling the vote (and thus able to sell it) rather than the Federation, and any highbrow theory on the matter would be mostly irrelevant. A defendant trying to get off by saying that he wasn't able to "legitimately contract" with the vote because it wasn't his by such-and-such extended logic should not be successful in defence. Both Kasparov and Leong clearly took it as a given that unless there was a major shakeup, Leong effectively controlled the Singapore vote for the 2014 election. Similarly, Makro could be said to effectively control the Greek vote, Azmai the Georgia vote, Short the English vote whenever it became clear that he would be the Delegate, etc.
I would say that it is ultimately he/she who "controls" the vote, and could contract on the matter
I can see no way you could contract to cast a vote which you were casting as a representative, even if that contract were not secret (which it was) and even if I thought contracting to sell one's own vote could be proper (which I don't).
Shorter me: this is very wrong on a whole number of levels.
I admit I am puzzled as to your meaning of representative, as I don't think it is how FIDE works.
Contrast the following systems:
1) Nancy Pelosi "represents" the San Francisco district in the US Congress
2) The US Ambassador (Samantha Power) to the UN "represents" the US in the United Nations
With #1, Pelosi controls a vote from the time she enters office until she leaves (biennial elections). She could theoretically be dismissed by a recall election or something, but this is vanishingly rare in practice.
With #2, Power likely has specific instructions (at least on important matters), and will face consequences if not following them, including the real possibility of immediate dismissal. In this case, she would not control a vote, and is rather an agent of the country. She could still be unfaithful in her representation (which itself is a type of contract between herself and the US government) on any specific vote, but that wouldn't change the underlying conclusion that here the US (and not the ambassador) controls the vote. One can argue that the head of the US Executive branch (and not "the USA" itself) ultimately controls the US vote, and indeed as a practical matter vis-a-vis bribery I would be inclined to agree (probably the opinion would be different in parliamentary systems, where the executive is more subject to dismissal).
By my understanding, most FIDE federations operate in practice closer to #1, and only a few like #2. In the specific case of Singapore, the delegate to FIDE is not even mentioned anywhere in their Constitution, and I suspect this is the norm.
Moreover, there is additionally a third element in FIDE, and that is the secretness of the voting. There is typically no effectual way, most notably in FIDE Presidential elections, that a federation can verify that its representative voted in a particular way. I would interpret this to mean that no matter whether a federation's bylaws are setup like #1 or #2, said representative in practice controls the vote in FIDE.
I would think that most "Western" chess federations operate the "UN" model as applied to FIDE. In other words, whatever the policy, it is endorsed by the the Board and the membership at large, to the extent that they can vote or express opinions on the subject.
RdC
I also reiterate my previous observation: if you don't think that Leong had the capacity to sell his presumed vote as Singapore delegate, then he defrauded Kasparov on the matter, in pretending that he effectively controlled said vote (within the bounds of mutually agreed risk of unforeseen events occurring before the Aug 2014 election).
In that case, the CAS decision should be phrased something like "he attempted to sell Singapore's vote [over which he had no effective control] to Mr. Kasparov." It's not inconceivable that the CAS Panel realized this was pedantically correct but (thrice) chose to write the more colloquial "he sold *his* vote" due to the likely reading audience of the decision, but my strong suspicion is that they looked at the matter practically and determined that he *did* have effective control over the vote, and thus *could* sell it.
@RdC: I am not so sure. For instance, the ECF on the matter:
17. At the Annual General Meeting...
(2) The Council shall elect the FIDE Delegate and the Chairman of the Council who shall unless the Council resolves otherwise hold office until the end of the Annual General Meeting next following.
"the Council" .. compris[es] those persons entitled to attend and vote at General Meetings..
Note that the FIDE Delegate is elected by the Council (the entirety of membership IIUC), rather than be appointed by the Board. I would say this is closer to model #1, as even with the crazy nature of the ECF it would be unlikely that a special Council Meeting would be called to dismiss specifically the FIDE Delegate.
In contrast, in the US it says: Section 4. International Affairs. The Federation is the official USA unit of FIDE and shall be represented officially in all FIDE affairs by a Permanent Delegate appointed by the Executive Board. Here the Delegate is (theoretically) answerable to the Board, which is my #2 form of representation.
To my mind, whether said Delegate typically pays any heed to the Board/membership is not the main consideration in distinguishing #1 from #2 in the meaning of "representative", but rather whether there is a real possibility of immediate repercussions. Of course, with a #2 model there can be a fluidity depending on how important a vote is, and how specific the instructions are.
I also looked at Australia: no mention of FIDE Delegate AFAICT; South Africa: the membership appoints a delegate for 2 years; Hong Kong: Committee appoints, Delegate "is bound" to vote as Committee directs and can be removed at any time (quite strong #2); India: nothing mentioned; Namibia: nothing mentioned. Given the real-world power of such persons in FIDE, it is a bit surprising that so little is said.
It's really not that hard and bot that complicated. If you're a representative then a vote is not yours, regardless of whether or not you control it, or whether you ever consult or report back. "Effective control" is irrelevsnt. It's not the delegate's to sell even if selling were a legitimate thing to do.
Those entitled to vote at ECF meetings are almost exclusively the representatives of chess organisations such as counties, leagues and Congresses. A recent proposal that the FIDE Delegate should be appointed by the Board rather than voted alongside the Directors was roundly rejected, I don't think it even got as far as a vote.
There's little or no English support for a continued Kirsan presidency. This was affirmed back in 2006 when there was the novelty of a FIDE Presidential election. Even the lobby of Kasparov haters were unable to generate any Kirsan support in 2014.
RdC
There is something I don't understand. Was the "+1" from Leong/Singapore subject to the same conditions of deliverance as the other votes, namely either written and signed statement from the federation or an irrevocable proxy therein? The contractual framework suggests that it was.
If so, it seems that the only reason why the CAS could say that "he sold his vote" is that Leong himself "confirmed" that the vote was "his" when the Panel inquired about this. If he had instead said that the +1 was Singapore's vote, what would be the case against him?
The case would still be thst he was illicitly selling a vote he was casting, what's the diff?
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